Report drawn up on behalf of the Joint Committee on coordination of the activities of the 24 partner States of the Association in international organizations for economic cooperation and development, pursuant in particular to Protocol No. 5 to the Second Yaoundé Convention. Parliamentary conference of the Association between the EEC and the African States and Madagascar Working Document No. 41. by Glinne, E.
f' 
European  Econo11k  Community  - Assoc:lated  African  States and Matlaaclscar 
PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE  OF THE  ASSOCIATION 
BE1'WEEN THE EEC AND THE AFRICAN STATES AND 
MADAGASCAR 
WORKING  DOCUMENTS 
31 JANUARY 1973  ENGLISH EDITION 
Report 
drawn up  on behalf of the Joint Committee 
on 
coordination of the activities  of the  24  partner States of the Association 
in international organizations for economic  cooperation and development, 
punuant in particular to Protocol No.  5 
to the Second Yaounde Convention 
Rapporteur: Mr E.  GLINNE 
DOCUMENT41 At its meeting  in Florence  on  22  May  1970,  the Joint Committee  decided 
to submit to  the  Parliamentary Conference of the Association  a  working  docu-
ment  on  coordination of the activities of the  24  partner States of the 
Association  in international organizations  for  economic  cooperation and 
development,  pursuant in particular to  Protocol  No.  5  to  the  Second Yaounde 
Convention.  The  Joint Committee  appointed Mr  Hein  rapporteur. 
The  Joint Committee  examined matters relating to coordination of the 
activities  of the  24  partner States of the Association at its meeting  in 
Libreville on  30  October 1970. 
After the  death of Mr  Hein,  the Joint Committee  pppointed Mr  Glinne 
rapporteur. 
At  its meeting at The  Hague  on  13  January 1972,  the Parliamentary 
Conference of the Association examined Mr  Glinne's working  document  and 
referred it back to the Joint Committee.  At  its meeting at The Hague  on 
14  January 1972,  the Joint Committee  appointed Mr  Glinne rapporteur. 
The  motion  for  a  resolution and  accompanying  explanatory statement were 
examined  and  unanimously  adopted by  the Joint Committee  in Luxembourg  on 
31  May  1972. 
The  following were  present:  Mr  Achenbach,  President,  Mr  Ngo'o  Mebe 
(Cameroon),  Vice-President,  Mr  Glinne,  Rapporteur,  Mr  Aigner,  Mr  Bersani, 
Mr  Briot,  Mr  Ntakabanyura  (Burundi),  Mr  Sevot  (Central African  Republic), 
Mr  Bakoure  (Chad),  Mr  Galibali  (Congo),  Mr  Faboumy  (Dahomey), 
Mr  D'Angelosante,  Mr  Fellermaier,  Miss  Flesch,  Mr  Bouanga  (Gabon), 
Mr  Ebagnitchie  (Ivory Coast),  Mr  Kollwelter  (deputizing for Mr  Galli), 
Mr  Andrianatoro-(Madagascar),  Mr  Sissoko  (Mali),  Mr  Fall Babaha  (Mauritania), 
Mr  Gaoh  (Niger),  Mr  Riedel  (deputizing  for Mr  Werner),  Mr  Ndahayo  (Ruanda), 
Mr  Seefeld,  Mr  Guillabert  (Senegal),  Mr  Giama  (Somalia),  Mr  Spenale,  Mr  Buda 
(Upper  Volta),  Mr  Kassongo  (Zaire). 
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MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
on  coordination of the activities of the  24 partner States 
of the Association in international organizations  for 
economic  cooperation and development,  pursuant  in parti-
cular to Protocol  No.  5  to the Second Yaounde  Convention 
The  Parliamentary Conference of the Association, 
- meeting at Kinshasa  from  29  to  31  March  1973,  pursuant to Article  52  of 
the Convention  of Association between the European  Economic  Community  and 
the African  and Malagasy States,  signed at Yaounde  on  29  July 1969, 
- recalling its resolution of  13  January  1972,  and  in particular section  2
1 
thereof, 
- having regard to the report presented by Mr  Glinne  on behalf of the Joint 
Committee  (Doc.  41), 
1.  Believes that more  energetic efforts  should be made  by the partners  in the 
Association  in order to work  actively towards  a  constructive political 
dialogue between  the EEC  and AASM; 
2.  Invites the Council  of the Communities  to take all necessary steps to 
prevent the consultation of the AASM,  for  which provision is made  in 
Protocol  No.  5,  from becoming purely  formal,  in particular by organizing 
a  constructive dialogue between the partners,  involving detailed examina-
tion of relevant  issues; 
3.  Believes that closer consultation between the partners  in the Association 
- especially after the enlargement  of the  EEC  - should result in  common 
international action with  a  view to the conclusion of world agreements  on 
primary commodities,  beginning with cocoa; 
4.  Stresses the  importance of the procedure  for  consultation and  information 
on·  commercial  policy and calls  upon  the Council  of Association to devote 
greater space in its activity report to the  implementation of decision 
No.  35/71  on this procedure; 
5.  InvLtes  its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying 
report to the Council  of Association,  the European  Parliament  and the 
Parliaments  of the Associated States and also to the Council  and  Commis-
sion of the European  Communities. 
1  Official Journal  of the European  Communities  C  11,  7  February 1972,  p.  7. 
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EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
I.  Scope  of coordination 
1.  The  problems raised by the  proposed coordination of the  activities of 
the  24  partner States of the  Yaound~ Association  concern not only the  economic 
sector but also the joint representation of political interests. 
Several provisions  in the Convention  of Association  - see  in particular 
the  preamble1  - indicate that the  members  of  the Association did in fact 
envisage  the  pursuit of  common  political aims.  The  Contracting Parties wish 
to  'demonstrate  their common  desire  for  cooperation  on  the basis of  complete 
equality and  friendly relations•;  this affirmation necessarily implies that 
they wish  to achieve  a  measure  of political coordination or,  conversely,  that 
they will abstain from  any measure which might be  interpreted by one  or more 
partners  as  an  •unfriendly act•. 
Yourcommittee  believes that,  broadly speaking,  economic policy cannot 
be  isolated from  considerations of general policy.  If the political positions 
of  the partners conflict, it becomes  impossible  to achieve  and  defend jointly, 
in relations with other countries,  a  compromise between  the  economic  interests 
of  sovereign States.  However,  questions  of general  poli~y will only be dealt 
with  in  these pages  where  this is necessary to ensure  a  fuller understanding 
of the whole  situation. 
2.  The  volume  of joint activities of the  24 partner States of the Association 
2  in  international organizations for  economic  cooperation  and development  - and 
1 
2 
1 (The Contracting Parties) ••• 
- wishing to demonstrate their common  desire for  cooperation  on  the basis 
of complete equality and friendly relations,  observing the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, 
- determined to pursue their efforts together with  a  view to the  economic, 
social and cultural progress of their countries ••• • 
In particular UN  agencies  (UNCTAD,  UNDP,  FAO,  UNIDO),  UN  regional economic 
commissions  (ECE  and ECA),  GATT  and  the organizations responsible  for 
administering international agreements  on  primary commodities. 
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interests of· these States·are coordinated.  The  quantitative scope- and 
therefore,  in fact,  the quality - of joint efforts to defend the  interests 
of  the Association  in relations with  other countries  therefore  appears  as  a 
simple effect of  the  internal situation. It follows  that the  problem of 
coordination  comes  down  in the  end to that of harmonizing the  divergent 
economic  interests of  the partner States of the Association. 
In this  document  we  shall therefore  examine what  can be  done  to coor-
dinate  the  economic  interests of the members  of the Association  from within. 
This  seems  all the more  necessary in view of the varied- inyour  committee's 
opinion  too varied  - membership  of  the host of  international organizations 
·~ealing with  problems  of  economic  cooperation  and  developrnent1 :  this certainly 
does  not facilitate joint action in relations with  other countries or even 
coordination within  the Association itself. 
1.  The  coordination  of national political  and other interests of  sovereign 
States in order to achieve  a  joint aim  is in practice the  foundation  of  almost 
all foreign  policy activity; it is the  subject of most treaties and  conven-
tions under  international  law.  As  the quantitative  scope  of coordination 
depends  in turn  on  an  •analogy of interests•, which means  that harmonization 
becomes  all the easier  as  interests  approach each  other more  closely.  When 
interests  are  diametrically opposed,  it is by definition  impossible  to 
harmonize  them,  and politically they imply the  absence  of  coordination. 
4.  The  Yaound~ Convention  starts out  from  certain  - fairly limited -
similarities of  interest  among  the  24  partners  and  goes  on  to define  a  number 
of  common  aims.  The  Convention  does  not,  however,  disregard the  significant 
clashes of interest which  separate,  in  terms both of  actual situations  and  of 
political objectives  - especially in  social policy - the Associated African 
States  and Madagascar  (referred to below  as  the  AASM)  from  each other  and 
\ 
from  the European Community.  For certain specific spheres,  conditions of 
joint action by the  contracting parties have  therefore been  envisaged,  with-
out however  defining  the ~actical scope  of  such  action or the methods  to be 
adopted where  no  specific rules of procedure  are  laid down  in the Convention 
or where  the rules laid down  are  insufficient. 
II.  Instruments of coordination 
5.  Where  the coordination of the  interests of  sovereign States is covered 
by  a  treaty or is simply the  subject of  a  declaration of intent  (e.g.,  as  is 
frequently the case,  in press  comrnuniqu~s issued after international conferen-
ces)  it is essential,  if progress is to be made  beyond the  stage of  good 
1 
See  Annexes  II and III. 
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for  coordination by laying down  a  procedure whose  scope  may  certainly vary but 
which must  at least define  the  technical  conditions  of coordination  and  the 
time it is to begin. 
As  to how  tpe task is to be  tackled,  this can  only be  settled satis-
factorily by defining  the  instruments of coordination to be used. 
6.  The  conventional instruments  to coordinate interests at the  international 
level are: 
- information,  i.e. keeping one's partner(s)  regularly  (or  even  occasionally) 
informed of one's problems  and  aims,  and  of  the  consequent policy or  action 
envisaged.  In  international  law this  amounts  to a  unilateral declaration to 
other States·made  in principle before  the  State concerned takes  any 
1  measures  ; 
- consultation,  i.e.  a  request for  the  opinion  of the  partner(s)  concerned  on 
the measures  envisaged,  and possibly also joint discussion  of  the  problems, 
2  but with no  obligation to reach  an  agreement  • 
7.  In  addition to these conventional  instruments  of coordination which have 
grown  out of practical international relations,  the usages  which have 
developed for  special reasons,  for  the  sake  of  administrative efficiency or 
merely on  grounds  of diplomatic  courtesy,  are  also important.  Agreements 
between  delegations  attending international conferences  on  the pursuit of  a 
common  strategy and,  more  generally,  personal contacts,  are  instances  in 
point. 
While  these  procedures  are  not binding,  they have  the  advantage  of 
flexibility;  for  this very reason  they have  acquired an  importance which must 
not be underestimated. 
1  See  Decision No.  1/64 of  the Association Council  on  the  information  and 
consultation procedure  laid down  in Article 12  (Yaound~ I}  (paragraph I, 
Article 3);  provision has,  however,  been made  for  an  exemption  (Article  3, 
a-c)  whose  significance is difficult unless  the  intention is to cater  fo~ 
particularly urgent cases.  Information  on  action  already taken generally 
loses its informative nature.  (See  also Decision No.  35/71  of  the 
Association Council  of  22  April 1971  on  information  and  consultation 
procedure under Article 15(3}  of  the  second  Yaound~ Convention.  The  new 
procedure  is basically the  same  as  the previous  one} • 
2  Closer  coordination  imposing,  for  example,  the  obligation to reach  an 
agreement  would  already raise the problem of  sovereignty.  It would  then be 
necessary to determine  to what extent the  sovereign States intend to sub-
ordinate their national interests to  a  •community interest•  and  are  able 
to do  so.  This  problem is of course  fundamental  in connection with the 
transformation of  the European  Community into  a  political union. 
- 8  - CPA/CP/227/d~f. .. 
8.  The  instruments  of coordination  are,  however,  simply  a  technical means 
to  a  political end.  But this end can  only be  achieved  - as  is generally the 
case  in politics - if the parties concerned do not stop short at purely 
rhetorical declarations of good faith but sincerely wish,  in the  interests 
of all,  to harmonize  differing points of view.  This,  of course,  presupposes 
that all partners  inform  and consult each other.  A  one-way procedure  imply-
ing,  for  example,  that only the  economically weaker  partners  inform  a~d con-
sult the  economically stronger partners would certainly conflict with the 
resolve  to'pursue their efforts together with  a  view to the  economic,  social 
and cultural progress  of their countries'. •1 
III. Political and  legal basesfor coordination of the  activities of the  24 
partner States of  the Association  among  themselves  and  in international 
organizations for  economic  cooperation  and  development 
9.  The  political  and  legal foundations  for  coordination of the  activities 
of  the  24  partner States of  the Association were  laid by the Convention  of 
Association  signed on  20  July 1963  (referred to below as  Yaound~ I)  between 
the European  Economic  Community  and  the  18 African States  and Madagascar. 
The  second Convention  of Association  signed on  29  July 1969  (referred to 
below  as  Yaound~ II)  has  the  same basis.2 
10.  The  political aims  of  the  Yaound~ Convention  are  set out in its preamble: 
• (The  Contracting Parties) 
- reaffirming accordingly their desire  to maintain their Association, 
- wishing  to demonstrate  their  common  desire  for  cooperation  on  the basis of 
complete equality and  friendly relations,  observing  the principles of  the 
Charter of  the United Nations, 
- resolved to develop  economic relations between  the Associated States  and 
the Community, 
determined to pursue  their efforts together with  a  view to the  economic, 
social  and cultural progress  of their countries, 
However,  these political preoccupations relate  - as  is to be  expected 
given  the nature  of the Conventions  - only to relations between  the different 
partner States  and have  only  a  limited impact  on  external relations. Never-
theless  the  attitude of the  AASM  to non-member  States,  and  also of course to 
1  See  preamble  to the first  Yaound~ Convention. 
2  27  of the  64  articles of  Yaound~ I  have been  embodied unchanged  in the 
Yaound~ II.  In the  case  of  some  of the other articles,  the  amendments 
simply take  into account  changes  in the  situation.  The  provisions relating 
to the  institutions of the Association  and to information  and consultation 
procedures have been  taken over unaltered. 
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relations between  the  signatory States. 
11.  The  Yaound~ Conventions were  specifically designed by their authors  to 
establish  a  free  trade  area of  a  special kind  (implying  in  addition mutual 
assistance  - see Protocol No.  5  to  Yaound~ II) •  Inclusion  in  a  free  trade 
area normally implies  that its members  will in principle retain complete 
freedom  of  action in trade policy vis-a-vis non-member  States,  and this 
therefore holds  good  for  the  signatories to the  Yaound~ Conventions.  Because 
of this situation,  which  is the  outcome  of  a  political intention, it appears 
that in principle  the  attitudes of  the different States to external relations 
can  only be  coordinated to  a  limited extent.1 
However,  regardless  of this  independence  of  the partners  of  the 
Association  in matters of  trade policy,  allowance  must  always be  made  for 
the  fundamentally political principle of  'friendly relations'  set out in the 
preamJ 1e,  which brings out the desirability,  for  the purposes  of general 
policy,  of  a  harmonization  of the  interests of  the partner States that uses 
methods  other than  the  information  and consultation procedures  laid down  in 
the Convention. 
12.  As  we  have  seen,  the  legal bases  for  coordination  are  therefore  on  the 
modest  side,  and  the  number  of provisions  in the  Yaound~ Convention governing 
consultation  and  the  exchange  of information is fairly small. While  this 
state of  affairs is regrettable, it proves that the  24 partner States of the 
Association were  realistic enough  to entertain no  illusions as  to the full 
weight  of  the  differences between  their interests.2 
13.  Apart  from  the general principle enounced in the preamble,  coordination 
(information  and consultation)  of the policies of partner States is covered 
by the  following provisions  of  Yaound~ II: 
- Article 15 
- Article  60 
- Protocol No.  5. 
14.  Article 15  of  Yaound~ II stipulates that:  'The Contracting Parties shall 
inform each other of  any measures  they envisage  taking  in  the matter of trade 
policy vis-a-vis third countries if these measures  are  likely to harm  the 
interests of  one  or more  of  the Contracting Parties.  At  the  request of  the 
Community or of  an Associated State,  there  shall be  consultations within  the 
the Association Council.' 
1  Coordination facilities would be greater,  for  example,  in the  case of  a 
customs  union based on  a  common  external tariff. 
2  See Chapter  IV below. 
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consultations shall deal with measures relating to trade with third countries 
when  such  measu~es are  liable adversely to affect the interests of  one  or more 
of the Contracting Parties in particular in regard to: 
- the  suspension,  amendment  or  abolition of customs  duties, 
- the grant of reduced-rate or nil-duty tariff quotas,  save  for  the quotas 
referred to in Article  2(3)  above, 
- the  institution,  reduction or abolition of quantitative restrictions with-
out prejudice to the  obligations resulting for  certain Contracting Parties 
from  their membership  of  GATT.' 
Finally paragraph  3  of Article 12  stipulates that the Association Council 
shall  'define the procedure  for mutual  information  and consultation relating 
to the  application of this Article.•  This was  done by the Association Council 
Decision No.  1/64 of 8  July 1964.1 
By virtue of Article 15(3)  (Yaound~ II)  a  similar decision was  taken  on 
22  April 1971  (Decision No.  35/71)  which differs,  however,  in several respects 
from  the  previous  one.  The  provisions  of Council  Decision No.  1/64 are  extended 
to customs unions,  free-trade  areas  and economic  cooperation  agreements, 
procedural timetables  at the  same  time being harmonized.  To  enable  the 
Association Council  to effectively control  implementation  of  the  decision, 
provision is made  for  the Association Committee  to report to the Council  in 
its report  on  the  activities of the Association. 
The  Seventh Annual Report  on  the  activities of  the Association Council 
points out,  with reference  to the  new  decision,  that: 
'It would be  premature  to evaluate at this  stage  the practical implications 
of this decision which only came  into force  on  22  April 1971.  However,  in 
the  future it will probably further  improve  the  long-established relat~ons 
between  the Community  and Associated States in the  commercial policy 
sphere  and  so reinforce  one  of the basic elements  of the Association.• 
15.  Article  60  (Yaound~ II) 2  stipulates that the Association Council  'shall 
be  informed of  any request for membership of or  association with the Community 
made  by  any State.•  Paragraph  2  of  the  same  article stipulates consultations 
in the Association Council  following  •any request for  association with  the 
Community made  by a  State whose  economic  structure  and production  are 
comparable with those  of the Associated States  and which,  after examination 
by the  Community,  has been referred by the latter to the Association Council.' 
1  See First Annual Report  on  the  activities of the Association Council 
(Annex  II) • 
2  This  article is identical with Article  58  of  Yaound~ I. 
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economic  angle,  attracted particularly  close attention from  the partner 
States of the Association in connection with the  applications  for  accession 
to the  Community made  by the United Kingdom,  the Kingdoms  of  Denmark  and 
Norway  and the Republic of Ireland,  having regard in particular to the 
serious political,  economic  and  development problems raised by relations 
between  the  enlarged Community  and the African States of  the Cammonwealth.1 
16.  .In Protocol No.  5  (Yaound~ II) 2,  the Contracting Parties have  agreed, 
with particular regard to tropical products,  to  •take  into account their 
mutual  interests at international level  in  accordance  with  the principles 
forming  the basis of the Convention•,  and to this end to  •ensure  the  necessary 
cooperation particularly by means  of consultationswithin the Association 
Council'  and give  each other all possible  assistance. 
This provision clearly illustrates the possibility of ensuring,  by means 
of  a  convention  and  on  a  watertight basis,  coordination  •at international 
level'  - i.e. in particular within international organizations  for  economic 
cooperation  and development  - of the  interests of  the  24 partner States in  a 
limited but important sector of economic  activity,  not only in principle 
(• •••• in  accordance with the principles forming  the basis of the  Convention.~) 
but also  and  above  all in practice. 
17.  The  consultation prescribed by the Convention  does  not rule out  the  24 
partner States of  the Association  informing or  consulting each other  on 
matters  of  common  interest, in particular in  areas  close to those  covered by 
the Convention3,  either occasionally or  as  a  result of  a  gradually established 
practice.  The  rapporteur  considers,  however,  that consultation outside  the 
framework  of  the Convention will tend to became  superfluous  as  a  broader 
interpretation is given to its provisions for  coordination. 
If the widest possible range  of interests to be  coordinated is brought 
under  the Convention,  this will not only prove that the  partners  are  more 
than ever willing to cooperate but also offer the  inestimable  advantage  that 
harmonization will take place within  a  specific institutional framework. 
1  See  joint debate between  the European  Parliament  and  the Council of Europe 
and  the  following  documents:  Triboulet  (PE  25.226),  Bersani  (PE25.111), 
Westerterp  (PE  25.184)  and  1Les relations de  la Camrnunaut~  ~largie avec 
les pays  du  Commonwealth'  (PE  25.026)  etc. 
2  See  Protocol No.  4  to  Yaound~ I,  the  text of which is identical. 
3  For  example:  examination  of the results of the Conference  of the  Inter-
national Monetary Fund,  of food  aid granted by the  EEC,  etc. 
- 12  - CPA/CP/227/d~f. coordination  •in  a  vacuum•,  i.e. otherwise  than under  the Convention  and, 
therefore,  throuqh  the  coordinating bodies  (Association Council  and 
Association Committee)  might prove effective in certain cases but would 
lack the  legal  and institutional basis  so valuable  in international 
relations,  especially in the political sphere. 
IV.  Possibilities and  limits of coordination 
18.  Politics is the  art of the possible.  Every politician knows  that it is 
this that determines  the  international action of sovereign States which, 
with the  exception of  agreements  freely arrived at,  is governed by no 
imperatives.  This  is particularly true  in  the  sphere  of coordination. 
States  and governments still act  in  the  light of national interests;  to 
criticize them  for  this under  the present conditions  of  international policy, 
though  no  doubt  a  proof of good intentions,  would be  to fail to grasp the 
situation,  especially in regard to those African countries which,  freed  from 
colonial rule,  are  now  independent  sovereign States  and  as  such full members 
of  the  international community.  These  States,therefore,  like  the others,  make 
the best contribution they can to the pursuit of  aims  imposed  on  all of us 
and,  remembering  their recent history,  attach particular  importance,  under-
standably enough,  to their national  independence. 
19.  While  sharing  a  readiness  to view the  Yaound~ Convention  as  the basis 
for  their cooperation,  the  24  partner States nevertheless defend,  either 
individually or  in groups,  different interests,  and this is perfectly natural. 
Differences  in geographical or  demographic  situation,  in production  and raw 
material resources,  in climate,  etc.,  imply  a  wide variety of starting 
positions  and national interests.  On  economic  grounds  alone,  there  are  also 
natural differences  in interests between  the  six Member  States of  the 
Community  and  the  AASM.  Apart  from  the regional interests binding it to the 
AASM,  the European Community must  also meet  international obligations to the 
developing countries in Asia  and Latin America which  are becoming  increasing-
ly important  as world opinion grows  aware  of the political and economic 
situation of the  Third World.  These  natural clashes  of interest limit the 
scope  for  internal  and external coordination between  the .24 partner States 
and even  conceal  the  seeds of conflict  (e.g.  on  generalized preferences). 
20.  In this connection  there is one  problem which must not be  overlooked  and 
to which  your  committee feels  insufficient attention has  so far been given, 
even  though it touches  directly on  the very foundations  of  the Association. 
It appears that the  cooperation desired by all the  signatories to the  Yaound~ 
Convention  cannot in practice become  as  close  as it might be unless  the 
economies  of all the partners  operate  on  the  same  system:  in the  absence  of 
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the partners  of the Association  should  adopt jointly in  the  economic  sector. 
There  is therefore  an  inconsistency between  the  economies  of certain AASM 
States  - which  for  reasons  of  social policy or because  of their particular 
economic  situation adopt principles of state control or  economic  planning 
- and  the  economies  of the  EEC  Member  States  in which,  subject to certain 
reservations  and  in varying degrees  the principles of  a  free market  economy 
prevail.  Admittedly up to now the  adoption  of  a  pragmatic  approach has  over-
come  the practical difficulties encountered,  and  the  EEC  Member  States have 
shown  a  friendly understanding  towards  the  AASM.  Nevertheless the  problem 
remains  and it is difficult to see how it could be  solved satisfactorily by 
bringing  the  economic  systems  of the partner States more  closely into line 
at least as regards their trade relations. It is clear that if, under  the 
pressure  of events,  the  AASM  were  to adopt  the principles of  the Community 
- something  the Community itself could scarcely expect  them  to do if it has 
any regard for  their special political and  economic  interests  (sovereignty 
and  development needs)  - the risk of  disagreement harmful  to the Association 
would  sooner  or  later arise. 
v.  Practical aspects  of  coordination of  the activities of the  24  partner 
States 
A.  General 
21.  The  economic  interests of  the  24 partner States of  the Association  can 
only be  coordinated in  the  special institutions set up  for  this purpose under 
the Convention  (Association Council  and Association Committee)  if arrangements 
are  made  for  preliminary coordination.  The  Association Council  and Association 
Committee would in fact be  faced with  an  enormous  task if they were  required 
to harmonize  the many  divergent interests of  each partner State:  first,  the 
number  of divergent interests must be  reduced within  the  institutions set up 
for  this purpose1 . 
22.  Consultations  and  exchanges  of  information between partner States of the 
Association with  a  view to the  adoption  of  the most uniform positions possible 
in  international organizations  are not generally made  public.  Your  committee 
itself  had difficulty in obtaining information  on  this subject.  The  minutes 
of meetings  of the Association Council  and Association Committee  do,  however, 
give  an  indication  on  what  is being  done  by these bodies  and  on  the procedure 
1  For  the Community this is done  in the Council of Ministers or at the 
Conference  of  Permanent Representatives.  The  AASM  first coordinate their 
interests in the Coordination Council or  at meetings  of their represent-
atives accredited to the Community. 
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the  annual reports  on  the  activities of the Council of Association  to the 
Parliamentary Conference. 
23.  In  the  first of these reports  (1  June  1964  - 31  May  1965)  reference is 
made  in Chapter XI  to  •coordination between Member  States ·and Associated 
States•  while  in each of  the  four  subsequent reports  a  chapter is devoted to 
'Measures  of  cooperation between Member  States  and Associated States in order 
to take  into account their mutual  interests at international leve1•1 •  It will 
be noted that the  Sixth Annual  Report  does  not  devote  a  separate chapter  to 
coordination,  although it does  contain  a  number  of  comments.  The  Seventh 
Annual  Report,  on  the  other hand,  devotes  almost  two  pages  to measures  of 
international cooperation.  It is important to note  that here  for  the first 
time  the Association Council has  given  an  assessment of this form  of activity: 
'These  contacts  and consultations  organized locally in the  light of 
requirements  at the  request of  one  of the parties have  in general  lived 
up to the hopes  placed in  them,  and have helped to strenghten the 
position of  the Community  and Associated States in the  international 
bodies  in which  their interests may be  at stake  in one  form  or  another•? 
24.  An  initial general observation is called for:  from  the  outset coordinatkn 
of  economic  interests between  the  EEC  and  the  AASM  - in particular with  a 
view to the  adoption  of  common  positions  in  international organizations  for 
economic  cooperation  and  development  - was  a  basic element  in  cooperation 
between  the  24  partner States.  This  is proved by the  fact that the  future 
partners  of  the Association  already kept each other  informed  and held consult-
ations before  the first  Yaound~ Convention  carne  into force. 3 
1  See  the  Second Annual  Report,  Chapter XII,  sees.  98  to 110;  Third Annual 
Report,  Chapter XII,  sees.  83  to 85;  Fourth Annual Report,  Chapter XIII, 
sees.  97  to 101;  Fifth Annual  Report,  Chapter  VII,  pages  26  and  27;  these 
sections,  however,  only indicate  the  time  at which  the  exchanges  of 
information  and consultations  took place,  without giving  any details  on 
the results  achieved  and problems  studied  (cf.  the  examination of  the first 
Yaound~ Convention  in  GATT  in the  Second Annual  Report;  draft International 
Cocoa Agreement,  UNCTAD,  Protocol No.  4  to  Yaound~ I,  or relations between 
the Community  and East African States,  in the  Third Annual  Report;  consult-
ations  on  general matters within  the  framework  of the World  Trade Conference 
in the  Fourth Annual Report etc.). 
2  Seventh Annual  Report,  p.  42. 
3  In  1964  the  last members  to join the Association  already applied Protocol 
No.  4  to  Yaound~ I  for practical reasons before  they were  obliged to do  so; 
this was  the  case  in particular with  the  conferences  aiming  to  draw up  a 
world  agreement  on  cocoa  and coffee. 
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in considering the readiness of the partners in the Association to act jointly 
at the external level,  between  consultations  and  exchanges  of  information 
leading up to  a  future  international event,  and therefore necessarily precedmg 
it,  and  ad hoc  coordination which may  prove  necessary at the  conference table 
in face  of  an  unexpected situation. 
your  committee is glad to see  that all the parties concerned have  tried 
to coordinate their positions  on  important matters  of principle in the 
Association Council or Association Committee,  in particular because  they 
realized that the  problem  of harmonizing  divergent interests is generally 
much  too difficult to be  satisfactorily solved at  a  conference,  i.e.  in  a 
brief period of time.  Ad  hoc  conversations held on  the  spot,  important  though 
they may be,  have  almost  always  been  improvised,  especially when it became 
necessary to define  techniques  and tactics for  joint action.1 
26.  However  certain organizational weaknesses result from  the  fact that 
delegates  to international conferences  are not necessarily the  same  persons 
as  those who  meet  in the  coordinating institutions.  Exchanges  of  information 
between  the Association Council  and Association Committee  on  the  one  hand 
and persons  attending international conferences  on  the  other  are very unsatis-
factory,  especially because  the participants are not  always  the  same.  This 
was  the  case  in particular with the  GATT  negotiations during which  the 
Commission  failed sometimes,  though  of course unintentionally,  to take  into 
account  the  interests of  the  AASM  because its representatives,  who  were  not 
fully informed of the  discussions  in the Association Council  and Committee, 
did not sufficiently stress the requisite points.  The  same  thing occurred in 
connection with the  AASM.  Your  committeebelieves that these weaknesses  should 
be  remedied by making  sure  as  far  as  possible that the persons participating 
in discussions  in the coordinating bodies  also belong to the  delegations  to 
international conferences. 
27.  The  efforts made  by the  24  partner States to act jointly at international 
level have  always  come  up  against the fact that,  as  is stressed in the  •annual 
activity reports•,  the  Yaound~ Convention makes  provision for  coordination but 
does  not require the definition of  the  common  position. Mutual  information  and 
consultation  are  sufficient for  the Convention to be  respected,  and  in many 
cases when  the  differences of interest appeared too wide  purely formal 
consultations were all that took place. 
1  Many  examples  may be quoted:  ad hoc  conversations organized to ensure 
coordination proved very important  in the  GATT  negotiations;  they finally 
helped to overcome  gradually the  explosive  problem of regional preferences 
in  GATT. 
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always been  made  to bridge the  gap  b~tween different points of view.1 
28.  It is also  apparent  from  the  xeports that more  often than not it is the 
AASM  which  invite the  Community to participate in consultations.  One  may 
conclude  from  this that in general the  AASM  have  shown  more  interest in 
coordination than  the  EEC.  This  is understandable  even  if,  as your  committee 
believes,  this disequilibrium of initiatives in the  sphere  of coordination 
should be  ended,  if only for  psychological reasons.  The  notion  of  a  common 
purpose  is important  and  should not be  disregarded even  when  specific 
differences  of interest have  to be  discussed. 
29.  In studying the  conditions under which  coordination  occurs  in practice, 
your committee has  found  that the partners  in the Association  are  insistent 
on  the  whole  legal basis of  the Conventions being strictly respected. 
However  they proceed pragmatically when it is necessary to determine 
whether  information or consultations  should be  legally founded  on Article 15 
or  on  Protocol No.  5  t.o  Yaound~ I:. There  is  a  margin  of uncertainty here 
because it is in practice difficult to make  a  distinction between  these  two 
provisions,  since  they may be  applied to the  same  problems. 
30.  In this  connection your  comrnit·tee..  noted with satisfaction that there was 
no quibbling  on  either side  - and certainly not  on  the part of  the Communities 
- as  to the  interpretation of  Yaound~ li whenever  the  AASM  asked for  inform-
ation  or consultation.  This  is  true~  fo:.  example,  both  as  regards  the  number 
of  coordinating meetings  and  as  regards  the  problems  which  arose.  It is good 
to  see  that  the  Crnnmunity has  never  considered the notion  of  friendly 
relations defined in the  preamble  as  a  mere  formula but has  always  attempted 
to go  further  than it was  strictly obliged to do.  The  AASM,  for  instance, 
have been kept  informed by the  President of the Council of  the Community of 
the  problems  and negotiations  concerning the  enlargement of the  EEC  - of  so 
much  interest to them  - often  in far grea·ter  detail than required under  the 
terms  of  the Convention.  Similarly,  the Community has not been  sparing with 
the  information it was  able  to give  in  the Association Council  on  matters  of 
general interest to the Association. 
1  See  sec.  30. 
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31.  In the primary products  sector certain specific aspects of trade affect 
both  the  Community  and  the  AASM.  This is, however,  essentially a  matter of 
internal coordination  and  the problems which  arise rarely have  repercussions 
on  the Association's external relations,  for  example  under  Protocol No.  5  of 
Yaound~ II.1 
As  regards problems  of general policy on  primary products  (e.g.  prices 
and quotas)  informal discussions have  sometimes  been held in the past without 
any exchange  of  information or consultatior. within  the meaning  of Article 15 
of  Yaound~ II.2 
Nevertheless it must be  remembered that there  are  frequently marked 
differences between  the  interests of the EEC,  an  importing  and  consuming 
area,  and the  AASM  as  producing  and exporting countries. 
32.  Tropical products  (coffee,  cocoa,  bananas,  etc.), which  are  extremely 
important  to  the  AASM  commercially,  have  already been  the  subject of  a  large 
number  of coordinating meetings  during which  reference has been made  in 
particular to the  abolition of barriers to trade within  the  framework  of 
international negotiations on  coffee  and  cocoa. 
It is satisfying to note  that the  strenuous efforts made  by the  24 
Member  States of  the Association to reach  a  compromise  eventually succeeded. 
Since by undertaking  to abolish  customs  duties  the Community would have 
jeopardized the  AASM's  competitive  situation rapidly and to  an  intolerable 
degree,  it was  agreed in  connection with  the Coffee Agreement  to issue  a 
Declaration of Intent to the effect that the  EEC  Member  States would only 
gradually abolish  customs  duties  on  that product. 
33.  The  efforts made  by the  24  partner States to coordinate  their positions 
in preparation  for UNCTAD-II,  which was  held in New  Delhi between  1  February 
1968  and  29  March  1968,  are particularly important.  The  problem was  mor.··,~  com-
plex than  in  the  case  of coordination with  a  view to concluding  the World 
Coffee Agreement;  here  there was  a  need for  a  genuine  coordination 
of  interests permitting joint action of far wider  scope.  This  important 
1  Mention  should be  made  here  of negotiations on  the  International Coffee 
Agreement,  which is not  an  international organization in  the  normal  sense 
of  the word but nevertheless deserves mention. 
2  The  AASM  were  for  instance  consulted repeatedly on  the  subject of proposals 
to reduce Community  customs  duties  on  tropical products under  Yaound~ II 
(e.g.  reduction of duty on  coffee  from  9.6 % to  7  %,  on  cocoa  from  5.6 % to 
4  %,  and  on  olive oil from  9  % to  6  %)  . 
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problems  of  a  world trade policy and,  more  specifi~ally,  a  world policy on 
development.  In  accordance with Article  12  and Protocol No.  4  to  Yaound~ I, 
four  consultative_meetings were held during which  the  24 partner States of 
the Association had  ample  opportunity to  •explain  and in  some  cases harmonize 
their points of view on  a  number  of questions relating to the  work  of three 
committees'.  1 
During  these consultationsit again became  clear that the  interests of 
the Community  and the  AASM  differed2,  which was  scarcely surprising in the 
light of the different initial positions.3 
At  the  third session of UNCTAD,  held in Santiago de  Chile  from  13 April 
to  21  May  1972,  coordination between  the  24  partner States of the Association 
was  particularly satisfactory,  as  the  European  Parliament has  already pointed 
4  out  .  In particular,  the  Community  delegation organized several  informational 
meetings with delegations  from  the  AASM  and close contacts were  maintained 
with  these  delegations  throughout  the  conference. 
34.  This generally favourable  impression is, however,  offset by the  fact 
that other  attempts  at coordination were  clearly not very successful.  Your 
committee  is thinking in particular of  consultations in  connection with 
multilateral negotiations  in  GATT  on  plywood,  of trade relations between  the 
Community  and Latin American  countries,  and  in  a  general way,  of  the 
Community•s  development policy.  This  attempt  at coordination was  not  aimed 
at joint action in international organizations,  and  in this sphere  experience 
has  shown  that results  are generally mediocre. 
1  See  Fourth Annual  Report,  Chapter XIII,  sec.  1  (cooperation  and consultation 
within  the  framework  of the World  Trade  Conference  on  problems  of  a  general 
nature) . 
2  The  differences of  opinion were  particularly marked  on  generalized prefer-
ences.  The  AASM  wanted  the preferential  arrangements  from  which  they benefit 
on  the Community market  to be maintained;  they therefore  asked the Community 
to remain  as  faithful  as  possible  to the position it had  adopted  in  the past 
on  the  subject of preferences,  i.e. not to grant similar  advantages  to other 
developing countries.  However,  they want  the other industrialized countries 
to make  the most  generous  offer possible ensuring free  access  for  their 
manufactures  and  semi-manufactures  to the market of  non-member  States.  The 
Community  on  the  other hand supports  a  vast preferential system because it 
hopes to make  an  effective contribution to the  achievement of  the  aims 
defined in UNCTAD  Resolution  21  (II) •  The  possibility of  subsequent  adjust-
ments  to the Community's  offer was,  however,  considered in order  to correct 
unfavourable  situations which  arise  in the  AASM  from  application  of  the 
system of generalized preferences. 
3  See  motion  for  a  resolution presented under  the Algiers Charters by the 
group of  77  developing countries  to which  the  AASM  belong. 
4  Fellermaier opinion,  Doc.  83/72,  Annex,  3  July 1972,  Section 8. 
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level of development  aid policy,  especially as  this area is growing  in 
importance  in discussions  aimed  at increasing the effectiveness  of world 
economic  cooperation. 
Recent  years have  in fact  seen  the  setting up  of new  international 
organizations  concerned exclusively with  development  aid  problems~ other less 
recent organizations  are  now  concentrating on  this problem. 
It must,  however,  be pointed out that the Yaounde  Conventions  contain  no 
provisions  for  coordination in this sphere.  Your committee  feels  that the 
authors  of the Association Treaties studied this problem but had  sound  reasons 
for  excluding the possibility of harmonizing interests in the sphere  of 
development  policy.  In  fact,  because  of the polarization of interests  (donor/ 
beneficiary relationship)  coordination of interests  seems  scarcely conceivable 
in this area,  either within the Association itself or  in relation to inter-
national  organizations  for  economic  cooperation and  development. 
It would be highly desirable,  in the opinion of your  committee,  for  the 
Community to grant the AASM  optimal  development  aid;  such  an  aim,  however, 
would be difficult to defend  jointly vis-a-vis  non-member  countries since, 
for political reasons,  the AASM  can  and wish to act absolutely independently 
in this area. 1 
c.  The  special  case of satellite telecommunications 
36.  The  European  members  of  ELD02  and  ESR03  - i.e. all the Community 
countries with the exception of Luxembourg  - have  coordinated their action  in 
4  the European  Space  Conference  ,  in particular for  the purpose of  conducting 
negotiations with the United States  on  satellite telecommunications.  It would 
be all the more  desirable to extend this cooperation to the Member  States  of 
1 
2 
For  a  given  potential  of  development  aid  from  the Community,  the volume  of 
aid granted to non-member  States  complements  the aid granted to the AASM 
(the greater the aid received by other countries, the less will be  available 
to the AASM).  This  problem played a  crucial role  in the negotiations  on 
renewal  of Yaounde  I.  · 
ELDO  =  (CECLES  - ELDO)  European  organization for  the development  and  con-
struction of  space vehicle launchers.  Member  States:  Australia,  Belgium, 
France,  Italy, Netherlands,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  United Kingdom. 
3 
ESRO  =  (CERS  - ESRO)  European  Space Research Organization.  Member  States: 
4 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Italy, Netherlands,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  United Kingdom,  Sweden,  Switzerland. 
ESC  = European  Space Conference.  Member  States: Australia,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Spain,  France,  Italy~ Norway,  Netherlands,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
United Kingdom,  Sweden,  Switzerland. 
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to the  principle of  a  regional  telecommunications  satellite programme;  the  aim 
of this  programme  would  be  to ensure  the  relaying of public  service  telecommu-
nications,  i.e.  telephony,  telegraphy,  data  transmission,  radio and  television, 
in an  area covering  Europe  and  the Mediterranean  seabord in the  1980s. 
As  a  more  basic issue,  it remains  to be  decided whether  the  role  accorded 
to Europe  and  the  third world  - including  the  AASM  countries  - in the world 
satellite telecommunications  system known  as  INTELSAT  (International  Telecom-
munications  Satellite Consortium)  can be  considered  satisfactory~  in view of 
the  fact that this  rather curious organization may  have  a  serious  impact on 
the cultural,  economic,  technological and even political interests of  the 
partner States of the  Yaounde  Association. 
37.  Certain background  information on  this matter warrants  attention: 
1.  In the  United States,  the American  Telegraph  and  Telephone  Company  (ATT) 
enjoys  an  unquestionably dominant  position in the  telecommunications  sec-
tor,  through its own  resources  and  ownership or control of other companies, 
the  most  important of which  are Western Electric  and  Bell  Telephone 
Laboratories. 
In 1962,  after the  advocates  of public ownership of  the satellite telecom-
munications  network were  defeated in Congress,  ATT  and  a  few  ot!.1er  compa-
nies,  amounting  to all intents  and  purposes  to  a  telecommunications  cartel, 
were  authorized to organize  the  operation of satellites through  the  COMSAT 
consortium  (Communications  Satellites Corporation) .  ATT  has  an  overwhelming 
voice  in this consortium as it does  in  INTELSAT,  of which  COMSAT  is the 
operational body.  Is it acceptable  for  the  organization of satellite tele-
communications  in Western  Europe  and Africa to be  in effect dependent  on 
the  goodwill  and  prior interests of  a  vast private American  company? 
2.  In July 1961,  the White  House  published  a  declaration of intent drawn  up 
by  President Kennedy,  in an  attempt  to  reach  a  compromise:  private owner-
ship and  management  of relay satellites would be  supported,  provided that 
certain conditions were  met;  one  of these,  which directly concerned  the 
third world,  was  that the  system must be  •global•  so  as  to obtain an 
efficient telecommunications  network  serving  the whole world,  including 
commercially unprofitable  regions.  This  condition has  been disregarded  in 
the  COMSAT  and  INTELSAT  operations;  the  international treaty setting up 
INTELSAT  authorizes  special  telecommunications  satellite programmes  only 
if they will not. be  a  •significant economic  burden  on  the  INTELSAT  system•. 
3.  INTELSAT  was  set up by  a  •provisional agreement•  signed in Washington  on 
20  August 1964;  a  final  agreement was  laid open  to signature  on  20  August 
1971.  In conformity with Article VII  of the provisional  agreement,  the 
space  sector is to be  managed by  COMSAT.  Under  the  final  agreement,  imple-
mentation of the  convention will be  administered,  after a  six year  transi-
tional period,  by  an  executive  under  the  authority of the Director General. 
1  See  also written question No.  235/72  by  Mr  Glinne  (Europe•s  role in 
INTELSAT),  OJ  C  138,  31  December  1972 
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at  one  and the  same  time the manager  of  INTELSAT,  the representative of the 
US  Government  in  INTELSAT  and  a  private business  concern whose  aim must  be 
to earn profits  for  its shareholders.  The  fact that  INTELSAT  programmes  are 
sometimes  subject to prior approval by US  Government  control agencies  cannot 
be  considered adequate,  since this control makes  a  mockery  of the  'inter-
national  character'  of  an  organization which  is too American to be genuinely 
international and too dependent  on private interests to be altruistic. 
The  structure given to INTELSAT  in May  1971  (the Assembly  may  make 
recommendations  but  cannot take decisions)  has  also sown  serious  doubts 
among the  79  participating States which  are  now  reluo:tant  to become  official 
members:  at the time of writing,  France has still not  signed,  apparently 
because  of perplexity over the four  levels  of authority in  INTELSAT: 
- the Board of Governors  responsible for  decisions  on  all financial  and 
technical matters;  voting rights are proportional to investment,  so that 
while  COMSAT  does  not  enjoy  an  absolute right of veto it still has  40%  of 
the votes •••  A  few  seats,  carrying insignificant voting rights, will be 
granted to countries which  may  represent regional  interests; 
- the assembly of  signatories:  telecommunications  representatives  from  all 
the Member  States will meet  annually to consider  reports  submitted by the 
Board  of  Governors; 
- the assembly  as  such which will meet  once  every two years  and have practic-
ally no  powers; 
- the executive, consisting of the Director-General  and  COMSAT  for  day-to-day 
management. 
39.  In  1973,  assuming that all the countries  expected to  join in fact  do 
so,  the Board of  Governors will call upon  at least three experts,  recruited 
internationally, to deliver opinions  on the final  organization to be  adopted 
for  INTELSAT  after the six year transitional period which has  recently begun. 
Would it not be desirable for  the  EEC  and  AASM  to coordinate their 
approach to this very  important matter? Their  aim  could be to give greater 
weight to the developing countries  and  a  more  substantial role to European 
industry;  they could also advocate effective participation by the Eastern 
bloc  countries  and satisfaction of the United  Nations~ needs,  in particular 
by making  a  number  of satellite circuits available to the UN  without  charge. 
The African countries  in particular have  an  enormous  potential interest  in 
recourse to satellite telecommunications  for  maintaining contact with the 
United Nations  Organization  and its specialized agencies  and with the  EEC 
- 22  - CPA/CP/227/d~f. and its bodies  responsible for  cooperation,  both for their cultural develop-
ment  and to promote  economic  and  social progress. 
D.  The  area of application of Protocol  No.  5 
40.  The  enlargement of  the Community will also present the Association with 
problems.  It can  already be  expected that  a  large number  of Commonwealth 
countries will wish  to participate in the  Yaound~ Association,  which  repre-
sents  an  original effort to establish cooperation between  the  industrialized 
and  developing countries. 
Without having institutions of  the  type  set up under  the  Yaound~ Conven-
tion,  these  coun~ries have  nevertheless  long been  accustomed to  compare  notes 
on  their problems,  especially in the  sphere  of foreign policy in  the Common-
wealth.  Clearly the  countries  concerned  attach great importance  to the 
possibility of examinin9 certain important political problems  jointly.  They 
are  likely to continue this habit after the United Kingdom's  accession  and 
after the  creation of ties of association between  the  enlarged EEC  and many 
Commonwealth  countries.  It would  appear  desirable  for  the African States 
which  are  at present members  of  the Commonwealth  to find in the  Yaound~ 
Institutions at the very least an  equivalent,  both in  amount  and  in kind,  of 
the  coordination practised within~  the Commonwealth  on  major  foreign  policy 
problems. 
41.  The  Member  States of  the European Communities  have  for  some  time  tended 
to go beyond the strictly national analysis of certain foreign  policy problems 
to arrive at  a  common  approach.  Your  committee believes that if the  EEC 
-- "------------
governments  can  already manage  to  arrive at common  positions  as  was  the  case, 
for  example,  on  the Middle East, it is essential to try to make  some  progress 
at the  level of EEC-AASM  relations,  even  though  the political aims  of the 
Rome  Treaty and  the  declared objective of political union between  the Member 
States  are  not reflected in the  Yaound~ Convention. 
If interested parties in the Association  are  fond  of pointing out that 
the  latter is a  political option1,  the  time has  surely come  to take  the 
appropriate  steps.  If we  want  a  real dialogue  enabling us  to increase  the 
scope  and  depth of the Association,  we  must  also strengthen the  system of 
coordination  laid down  in Protocol No.  5.  The  text of this Protocol presents 
1  See  for  instance the  speeches made  by Mr.  Vale  and Mr.  Yac~ on  11 January 
1971  at the  Parliamentary Conference  in  Yaound~,  and  the  final  statement 
issued after the meeting of the  joint Committee held in May  1970  in 
Florence reaffirming  'that the reciprocal  commitments· entered into from 
the outset by the  AASM  and the  EEC  Member  States are  the result of  a 
political choice which binds all the partners indissolubly together.• 
- 23  - CPA/CP/227 I  d~f. no obstacle.  As  Mr.  Damiba pointed out in the  speech he  gave  as  President of 
the Association Council to the Joint Committee meeting in Libreville in 
October 1970:  'As  regards  the  sphere  of application  (of this protocol), 
suffice it to say that it allows  coordination in  any international body 
provided that the Community or  AASM  believes such  coordination necessary. 
There  are  therefore no rigid rules in this sphere.• 
VI.  Conclusions 
42.  In  conclusion,  the main points set out in this working  document  can be 
summarized  as  follows: 
a)  coordination of the  activities of  the  24  partner States of  the Associa-
tion  in international organizations for  economic  cooperation  and  development 
is dependent  on  the  extent to which  the  economic  interests of the  partners 
can be harmonized within  the Association.  The  Association's external  relation~ 
in particular its dealings with international organizations  (coordination of 
which is governed only by Protocol  No.  5,  assuming  a  strict interpretation of 
the  Yaound~ Convention)  are therefore dependent  on the  coordination of in-
ternal relations between the  24  partner States. 
b)  The  scope  for  joint action between these  24  countries in international 
organizations is limited.  Because  of the differences existing from  the  outset 
in the political  and  economic positions of  the partner States of the Associa-
tion, it is difficult to coordinate  their interests completely.  The  Associa-
tion was  in  any case  designed  according to the wish of all partners  as  a  free 
trade  area; but  a  free  trade  area by definition does  not  lend itself to 
harmonization because  all its members  hope  to achieve  and maintain  complete 
commercial  and  economic  independence. 
c)  The  Yaound~ Convention  takes this fact  into account:  it provides  for  the 
exchange  of  information  and consultations only in three  spheres  in which 
coordination is possible  - commercial policy,  enlargement,  tropical~~~ets. 
Fuller harmonization is not excluded but isscarcely possible for  areas 
analogous  to those  covered by the Convention except  on  the basis of  'friendly 
relations•. 
d)  The  consultations stipulated in certain cases by the Yaoundd  Convention 
include no  legal obligation to reach  agreement;  nevertheLess  experience  shows 
that the partners  in the Association have  to some  extent tried,  even  though 
they were  not legally bound to do  so,  to use  consultations to harmonize  their 
points of view. 
- 24  - CPA/CP/227  ;fi~f. e)  In  the  opinion  of all the parties concerned the efforts made  by the  24 
partner States to achieve  coordination have  so  far been  successful,  given 
that one  cannot expect miracles.  This  success  in coordinating interests has, 
however,  been  achieved  less  in joint action within  the  framework  of inter-
national organizations  for  economic  cooperation  and  development  in  the  narrow 
sense  of the  term than  in effective cooperation  as  regards tropical products 
(e.g.  the  agreement  on  coffee)  and  in  GATT. 
f)  The  benefits of coordination  - the  yardstick to measure  the effective-
ness  of  the Association itself - will be put to the test during  the  forth-
commg discussions  on  the  problem of  the Community's  enlargement  and of  the 
possible extension of the Association to take  in  the African Commonwealth 
States,  which  is bound to affect the  competitive position of the  AASM  in the 
tropical products  sector.  We  shall then  see  to what extent the present 
partners in  the Association,  having regard to their national interests,  can 
or wish  to place their special interests in  the  service of the  general 
interest. 
In this connection it should be pointed out that the  Yaound~ Parliament-
ary Conference called upon  the  EEC  and  AASM 
1to encourage  jointly a  genuine 
policy  on  primary  commodities  by  extending  on  a  worldwide basis the efforts 
currently being made  in UNCTAD  and  in the International Monetary  Fund11 •  The 
last World  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development held  in Santiago de  Chile  from 
13  April  to  21  ~ay 1972  offered the  24  partners  in the Association the best 
opportunity  for  this  joint action.  Fortunately  - as  the  European  Parliament 
also  noted  in Mr  Fellermaier
1 S  opinion of  3  July 1972  - coordination between 
the  24  partners was  particularly satisfactory on  that occasion. 
g)  A  new  chapter in the history of the Association began with the entry 
into  force  of the  second  Yaound~ Convention.  In recent years all the partners 
in the Association have  acquired experience which  was  t~<en into account  in 
drafting the  second  Convention.  The  fact that  no  changes  were  made  in the 
sphere of coordination certainly proves  that,  if a  realistic viewpoint  is 
adopted,  past  achievements  in harmonization give  grounds  for  satisfaction 
and that it would be difficult to  go  much  further. 
This  does  not mean  that developments  in the years  to  come  may  not  open 
up  new  prospects  for  extending the harmonization of interests which might 
perhaps  be  reflected legally in  a  third Association  Treaty. 
1 
OJ  of the European  Communities  C  13,  10  February 1971,  p.  91,  sec.  14. 
- 25  - CPA/CP/227/d~f. Annex  I 
Protocol  No.  5  to  the  second  Yaound~ Convention1 
concerning  measures  to be  taken by  the High 
Contracting Parties concerning  their mutual 
interests with particular regard to  tropical 
products 
THE  HIGH  CONTRACTING  PARTIES 
HAVE  AGREED  UPON  the  following  provisions which  are  annexed  to  the Convention: 
{1)  The  Contracting Parties agree  to  take  into account their mutual  interests 
at international level,  in accordance with the principles  forming  the 
basis of the  Convention. 
{2)  To  this end,  they  shall ensure  the  necessary cooperation,  particularly 
by means  of consultations within  the Association Council,  and shall give 
each other all possible assistance. 
(3)  Such  consultations shall  take  place more  particularly with  a  view  to 
undertaking appropriate measures,  by  common  consent and at international 
level,  to  solve  the  problems  that arise out of  the  disposal  and  marketing 
of  tropical products. 
1  This  text is identical with that  of  Protocol No.  4  to the  first Convention. 
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 ILO 
FAO 
UNESCO 
WHO 
IMF 
IBRD 
AID 
IFC 
ICAO 
UPU 
ITU 
WMO 
IMCO 
UNCTAD 
GATT 
IAEA 
UNICEF 
UNHCR 
UNDP 
- International  Labour Organization 
- Food  and Agriculture Organization 
- United Nations  Educational,  Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
- World Health Organization 
- International Monetary  Fund 
- International Bank  for  Reconstruction and  Development 
- Agency  for  International Development 
- International Finance  Cooperation 
- International Civil Aviation Organization 
- Universal  Postal  Union 
- International Telecommunications  Union 
- World Meteorological  Organization 
- Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
- United Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
- General Agreement  on Tariffs and  Trade 
(D:  admitted  de  facto,  decision pending) 
- International Atomic  Energy Agency 
- United Nations  Childrens  Fund 
(Member  of Executive  Bureau,  1968) 
- United Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(Member  of Executive  Committee,  1968) 
- United.Nations  Development  Programme 
(Governments  making  a  contribution) 
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Intergovernmental organizations,  other  than  UN  bodies,  within which  one  or 
more  associated African States cooperate with one  or  more  EEC  Member  States1 
Customs  Cooperation Council 
53  countries,  including:  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Gabon,  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar, 
Rwanda,  Upper Volta,  Belgium,  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands. 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic  Commission 
59  countries,  including:  Congo,  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Mauritania,  Belgium, 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands 
International Centre  for  the  Settlement of Disputes  relating to  Investments 
Member  States of  the World  Bank  or,  by  invitation,  other parties to  the 
Statute of the  International  Court of Justice which have  signed  the  Conven-
tion  (57),  some  of which  became  contracting parties  (x)  after ratification: 
Burundi,  Cameroon  (x),  Central African Republic  (x),  Chad  (x),  Congo  (x), 
Dahomey,  t Gabon  (x) ,  Ivory Coast  (x) ,  Madagascar  (x) ,  Mauritania  (x) ,  Niger  (x), 
Senegal  (x),  Somalia  (x),  Togo  (x),  Upper  Volta  (x),  Belgium,  France  (x), 
Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands  (x) . 
International Consultative  Committee  on  Cotton 
41  countries,  including:  Chad,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands. 
International Cryogenic Institute 
50  countries,  including:  Central African Republic,  Chad,  Gabon,  Ivory  Coast, 
Madagascar,  Mali,  Mauritania,  Niger,  Senegal,  Upper 
Volta,  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands. 
International Epizootic Office 
82  countries,  including:  Cameroon,  Central African Republic,  Chad,  Congo, 
Gabon,  Ivory Coast,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Mauritania, 
Niger,  Senegal,  Somalia,  Upper Volta,  Belgium, 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands. 
International Locust Control  Office 
16  contracting countries  (C)  or participants  (P),  including:  Burundi  (P), 
Zaire  (P),  Belgium  (C). 
1  Source:  Yearbook  of  International  Organizations,  12th edition 
(1968-1969) . 
31- CPA/CP/227/d~f.Ann.III International  Commission  on  Rice 
37  countries,  including:  Madagascar,  Mali,  France,  Italy,  Netherlands. 
International  Study  Group  on  Rubber 
30  countries,  including:  Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast,  Belgium,  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  Netherlands. 
International  Sugar  Council 
52  countries,  including:  Madagascar,  Upper Volta,  Belgium,  France,  Germany, 
Italy,  Netherlands. 
International Tin  Council 
23  producer  countries  (P)  and  consumer  countries  (C),  including:  Zaire  (P), 
Belgium  (C),  France  (C),  Italy  (C),  Netherlands  (C). 
International Union  for  the  Protection of Industrial  Property 
Member  States of  the  General  Union  (79-A),  Member  States of the  restricted 
Union  on  false  indications of origin  (29-B),  Member  States of the  Trade-Mark 
Union  (21-C),  Member  States of the  Union  for  International Registration of 
Industrial  Patterns  (14-D),  Member  States of the  Union  for  the  interclassifi-
cation of goods  and  services with  a  view  to  trade-mark registration  (24-E), 
Member  States of the Union  for  the  Protection of Names  of Origin  (8-F) : 
Cameroon  (A),  Central African Republic  (A), 
Chad  (A),  Congo  (A),  Dahomey  (A),  Gabon  (A),  Ivory 
Coast  (A),  Madagascar  {A),  Mauritania  (A),  Niger  {A), 
Senegal  (A),  Togo  (A),  Upper  Volta  (A), 
Belgium  (ACDE),  France  (ABCDEF),  Germany  (ABCDE), 
Italy  (ABCE),  Luxembourg  (AC),  Netherlands  (ACDE). 
International Union  for  the  Publication of  Customs  Tariffs 
67  countries,  including:  Burundi,  Ivory Coast,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Zaire, 
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands. 
World Organization  for  Sound  and Vision: 
7  countries,  including:  Cameroon,  Chad,  Senegal,  Zaire,  France,  Italy. 
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